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UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION

ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION

By its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States cooperating with Kuwait. Section C of this resolution deals with the elimination, under international supervision, of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with range greater than 150 kilometres (km), together with the related items and facilities. It also calls for measures to ensure that acquisition and production are not resumed. The Special Commission was set up to implement the non-nuclear provisions and to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear areas. The precise terms are laid out in paragraphs 7-13 of that resolution.

On 18 April 1991, after Iraq had formally accepted the provisions of resolution 687, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his report regarding the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Following acceptance by the Security Council of the report on 19 April, the Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Rolf Ekéus (Sweden) as the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and Mr. Robert Gallucci (United States) as the Deputy Executive Chairman. On 1 May, the Secretary-General appointed 19 other members of the Commission, from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic,[a] Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation,[b] United Kingdom and Venezuela. The current Deputy Executive Chairman is Mr. Pierce Corden (United States).

MANDATE

UNSCOM's mandate is the following: to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities; to take possession for destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; to supervise the destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and related major parts, and repair and production facilities; to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified above.

The Commission is also requested to assist the Director-General of IAEA which, under resolution 687, has been requested to undertake activities similar to those of UNSCOM but specifically in the nuclear field. Further, the Commission is entrusted to designate for inspection any additional site necessary for ensuring the fulfilment of the mandates given to UNSCOM and IAEA.

ORGANIZATION

Full sessions of the members of the Commission are held twice yearly to discuss policy issues and to assess the results of operations to date. In addition, a Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction Advisory Panel was established to draw up policy guidelines on the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons.

Following the establishment of UNSCOM as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the Office of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission — a small, full-time office to assist the Executive Chairman in the exercise of his functions — was set up at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with field offices in Bahrain and Baghdad. The Special Commission's operations are planned and managed, under the direction of the Executive Chairman, from New York. The Bahrain office serves as the assembly and training point for inspection teams, while the Baghdad office provides the required communications and logistical support in the field.

UNSCOM staff have been provided by Member States, the United Nations Secretariat — in particular the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Inspection teams have consisted of personnel made available by Governments, members of the Commission, the United Nations Secretariat, WHO and, in the nuclear field, by inspectors and staff of IAEA. The nuclear teams are organized by IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission. The inspectors are selected on the basis of their technical qualifications and expertise

UNITED NATIONS

with due regard to drawing them from as many Member States as possible within the range of available capabilities and experience. By the end of January 1993, a total of 772 individuals from 38 countries had served on inspection teams.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

THREE-STAGE PROCESS

The implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) entails a three-stage process. These stages are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is envisaged that there will be much overlap:

(a) an inspection and survey phase to gather the information necessary to make an informed assessment of Iraq's capabilities and facilities in the nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile fields;

(b) the disposal of weapons of mass destruction, facilities and other related items through destruction, removal or rendering harmless and the destruction of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, including launchers, other items and repair and production facilities;

(c) long-term monitoring to ensure ongoing verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with the plans prepared by the Special Commission and IAEA and approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991).

INSPECTION PHASE

Iraq is obliged to submit to the United Nations information on the locations, amounts and types of all proscribed items, which are to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. The Special Commission is responsible for designating for immediate on-site inspection any additional location in Iraq in relation to these items.

By the end of March 1993, 54 inspection missions had been fielded by UNSCOM and IAEA. Thirty-seven of these missions were related to non-nuclear matters: twelve chemical (including three destruction), three biological, three joint chemical and biological (one of which was conducted in conjunction with a nuclear inspection), and eighteen ballistic missile. Eighteen nuclear inspections were undertaken by IAEA with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission. In addition, there was an inspection of a computer centre in connection with computers suspected to have been used for prohibited activities.

The inspections undertaken have had to be energetic, rigorous and intrusive because of the failure of Iraq to adopt the candid and open approach to the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons programmes called for in resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). On 25 October 1991, the UNSCOM Executive Chairman reported that "while cooperation from Iraq has generally been forthcoming at the field level ... in relation to activities and resources declared by Iraq, a totally different attitude of non-cooperation, concealment and sometimes false information has emerged in relation to non-declared activities, resources and sites that have been designated by the Special Commission on the basis of its own assessments or of data supplied to it by States." This remains the case.

This situation led to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 707 (1991), by which the Council condemned Iraq's "serious violation" of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 and of its undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and IAEA; the Council presented a list of nine specific demands to Iraq.

In his 7 March 1992 report, the UNSCOM Executive Chairman informed the Council that "while some additional information on Iraq's programmes for the production of weapons of mass destruction had been obtained ... this had to be done through a procedure of question and answer. The Special Commission was convinced that such a procedure could not result in the detection of as yet undeclared elements of the Iraq programmes and that its usefulness had been exhausted. Information on such elements was essential for a full understanding of Iraq's programmes and could only be obtained if Iraq met its obligations under Council resolution 707 (1991) to provide full, final and complete disclosure of its programmes."

Notwithstanding the above, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, informed the Security Council on 11 March 1992 that Iraq was "no longer in possession of any of the weapons, munitions or major or minor systems prohibited by resolution 687" and that "the equipment used, or allegedly used, in producing such items has been identified". However, this statement was not accepted by the Security Council, which called on Iraq to fulfil all its obligations arising from relevant Council resolutions.

In discussions held on 12 and 13 March 1992 between officials from UNSCOM and the Iraqi delegation to the Security Council meeting, Iraq promised to deliver the full, final and complete disclosures in early

April 1992. This promise was followed, on 19 March 1992, by new Iraqi declarations concerning large numbers of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated equipment and vehicles that Iraq had not previously declared as required and which it claimed to have destroyed in the summer of 1991, in contravention of its obligation to hand over such items to UNSCOM for destruction under the latter's supervision. UNSCOM inspection teams have since substantially verified these declarations (see below).

On 10 June 1992, Iraq finally provided the Commission with "full, final and complete reports" on each of the weapons programmes covered by resolution 687 (1991). This was followed on 27 June 1992 by Iraq's initial declarations due under the ongoing monitoring and verification plans. These declarations were respectively 10 months and 7 months late. The Commission has concluded that the reports are wholly inadequate for its purposes but that they provide the basis for further dialogue aimed at the provision of full information.

Despite the obstacles placed in the way by Iraq, UNSCOM and IAEA have been able to compile much information about Iraq's capabilities and facilities of concern to them.

Nuclear field. In the nuclear field, the IAEA/UNSCOM inspections have uncovered three clandestine uranium enrichment programmes: electromagnetic, centrifuge and chemical isotope separation as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation. The sixth nuclear inspection led to the conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons development programme, aimed at an implosion-type nuclear weapon, possibly linked to a surface-to-surface missile project. Subsequent inspections have continued to reinforce and extend the discoveries made, particularly in the nuclear weapons development area. The Iraqi authorities continue to refuse to surrender information on suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment and to accept the Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the ongoing monitoring plan adopted thereunder.

Chemical field. So far Iraq has acknowledged possession of over 140,000 filled and unfilled munitions, 590 tonnes of bulk agent and 3,500 tonnes of precursor chemicals that will need to be destroyed. Iraq's facilities include the substantial chemical weapons production complex of the Al Muthanna State Establishment and three CW-related production plants in the Al Fallujah area. In addition to the central storage of filled chemical munitions, chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals in bulk at Al Muthanna, filled chemical munitions, often damaged and leaking, were stored at various sites throughout the country. Those which were judged safe to move have been transported to Al Muthanna, which has been designated as the central location for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons. Those which could not be moved are being destroyed on site. Destruction is complete at the Khamisiyah site and is underway at Mohammediyah.

Biological field. In the area of biological weapons capabilities, the inspection activities initially focused on the major research and development site at Salman Pak but many additional sites have been inspected. Substantial evidence that Iraq was engaged in an advanced military biological research programme has been collected. No evidence of weaponization has been found. The unilateral levelling of the Salman Pak facility by Iraq just before the arrival of the first biological weapons inspection team prevented UNSCOM from obtaining more detailed information on the precise scope of activities conducted in this area. However, the inspections have provided a sound data base for future monitoring of biological capabilities in Iraq.

In addition to the above, over 150 undeclared sites have been inspected because of their potential for storing chemical and biological weapons.

Ballistic missiles. UNSCOM inspection teams have verified the destruction of 151 missiles, 19 mobile launchers, 76 chemical and 113 conventional warheads for SCUD-variant missiles, 9 conventional warheads for Al-Fahd missiles, more than 130 missile storage supports and a number of support vehicles, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, 28 operational fixed Al Hussein missile launch pads and a further 32 fixed launch pads under construction and at various stages of completion, 11 decoy missiles, 9 Scud decoy vehicles, an assembled 350-millimetre supergun, incomplete component sets for two 350- and two 1000-millimetre superguns, and one tonne of supergun propellant. Additional chemical warheads for ballistic missiles have been found. All but 15 have been destroyed and plans are in place for the destruction of the remainder.

However, further work is required to obtain a full accounting of Iraq's missile capabilities before the Special Commission can certify that all proscribed items have been identified. A recent inspection team discovered items which, because of their relevance to resolution 687 (1991), need to be investigated further so that a decision can be made as to their future destruction,

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monitoring or use. Furthermore, Iraq's declaration of 19 March 1992 — that it had unilaterally destroyed, in the summer of 1991, previously undeclared ballistic missiles and numerous chemical munitions — demonstrates that Iraq has had in the past the ability and the will to conceal information and evidence from the Commission. This emphasizes the need for intrusive inspections to continue until such time as the Commission is confident that it has a full and accurate account of each of the programmes.

DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

The second phase of UNSCOM activities is the disposal of proscribed weapons, facilities and items. Given the very different nature of the weapons, material and facilities involved, separate procedures, with teams specifically assembled for the given tasks, are used for each category.

The Special Commission established a Destruction Advisory Panel to advise on the particularly difficult and hazardous area of chemical weapons destruction. Small fact-finding missions visited Baghdad in August and November 1991 for detailed technical discussions with the Iraqi authorities on the role of Iraq in the destruction of their chemical weapons munitions, agents, precursors and intermediates. The majority of the filled munitions and bulk agents is being destroyed at Al Muthanna. Facilities in which to destroy chemical agents by hydrolysis or incineration are now fully operational. Large-scale hydrolysis of nerve agent commenced on 24 September 1992 and the incinerator was commissioned on 12 November 1992. As of 6 April 1993, over 19,000 filled and unfilled chemical munitions have been destroyed by Iraqi personnel under the supervision at the Special Commission, in addition to 59,838 litres of sarin; 37,258 litres of mustard agent and 128,953 litres of chemical precursors. A large amount of equipment and facilities associated with Iraq's chemical weapons programme has also been destroyed.

Regarding ballistic missiles, in addition to the items listed above, Iraq has destroyed, under the supervision of the Special Commission, a significant number of buildings and equipment used or intended to be used for activities prohibited under resolution 687 (1991).

In the nuclear field, the Special Commission is assisting IAEA in the removal of weapons-usable material from Iraq and in the disposal of all other relevant items and facilities covered by paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), by destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate. The fresh uranium fuel for Iraq's nuclear reactors has already been removed from Iraq and arrangements are being made for the removal and reprocessing of irradiated fuel.

COMPLIANCE MONITORING

The third stage represents a long-term operation. Its main purpose will be to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its unconditional obligations not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any weapons or related items prohibited under section C of resolution 687 (1991).

As requested in that resolution, the Secretary-General and IAEA Director-General prepared and submitted to the Security Council two separate but closely coordinated plans for compliance monitoring. By approving these plans, under its resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, the Council mandated the Special Commission to implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of permitted chemical, biological and ballistic missile activities. The Council also requested the Commission to assist and cooperate with IAEA in the implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the nuclear field.

Under the plans, Iraq is obliged to provide, on a regular basis, full, complete, correct and timely information on activities, sites, facilities, material or other items, both military and civilian, that might be used for purposes prohibited under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). Furthermore, the Special Commission and IAEA have the right to carry out inspections, at any time and without hindrance, of any site, facility, activity, material or other items in Iraq. They may conduct unannounced inspections and inspections at short notice. They may inspect on the ground or by aerial surveillance any number of declared or designated sites or facilities.

Both plans entered into force immediately upon their approval by the Security Council on 11 October 1991. Iraq has failed to state its recognition of or act upon its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) or the plans. It failed to meet its first two reporting deadlines of 10 November 1991 and 15 January 1992. The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission stated, in his report of 7 March 1992 to the Security Council, that "in respect of Council resolution 715 (1991), and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder, Iraq was maintaining the position stated in a letter to the President of the Security Council ... which constituted an apparent rejection of the plans and thus of the resolution ... If this situation persists ... the Special Commission will neither be legally nor

practicably able to initiate the programme for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under section C of Security Council resolution 687."

At its meeting on 11-12 March 1992, the Security Council demanded that Iraq meet all its obligations, including those arising from Council resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council. On 27 June 1992, seven months after the Council resolution was adopted, Iraq gave UNSCOM initial declarations concerning non-nuclear activities which need to be monitored. However, the covering letter, in keeping with the statement in the letter dated 26 May 1992 from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council that Iraq only acknowledges its readiness to permit ongoing monitoring and verification activities under resolution 687, insisted that ongoing monitoring and verification activities be conducted on a basis acceptable to Iraq, i.e. not in accordance with the plans adopted under resolution 715. Furthermore, Iraq had stated in its 26 May 1992 letter its "demands that practical guarantees be agreed ... [concerning] the measures and methods of ongoing monitoring." This sentiment was echoed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq in his address to the Security Council in November 1992. The plan for ongoing monitoring and verification contains explicit methods for implementation which were approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. They are therefore mandatory.

[a]Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the receipt of their applications, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General Assembly that each be admitted to United Nations membership. On 19 January 1993, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were admitted as Member States.

[b]The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, the President of the Russian Federation informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council and all other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

UNSCOM INSPECTION SCHEDULE

NUCLEAR

15 May - 21 May 1991	IAEA 1/UNSCOM 1
22 June - 3 July 1991	IAEA 2/UNSCOM 4
7 July - 18 July 1991	IAEA 3/UNSCOM 5
27 July - 10 August 1991	IAEA 4/UNSCOM 6
14 September - 20 September 1991	IAEA 5/UNSCOM 14
21 September - 30 September 1991	IAEA 6/UNSCOM 16
11 October - 22 October 1991	IAEA 7/UNSCOM 19
11 November - 18 November 1991	IAEA 8/UNSCOM 22
11 January - 14 January 1992	IAEA 9/UNSCOM 25
5 February - 13 February 1992	IAEA 10/UNSCOM 27
5 February - 13 February 1992	IAEA 10/UNSCOM 30
7 April - 15 April 1992	IAEA 11/UNSCOM 33
26 May - 4 June 1992	IAEA 12/UNSCOM 37
14 July - 21 July 1992	IAEA 13/UNSCOM 41
31 August - 7 September 1992	IAEA 14/UNSCOM 43
8 November - 19 November 1992	IAEA 15/UNSCOM 46
6 December - 14 December 1992	IAEA 16/UNSCOM 47
22 January - 27 January 1993	IAEA 17/UNSCOM 49
3 February - 11 February 1993	IAEA 18/UNSCOM 52

BALLISTIC MISSILES

30 June - 7 July 1991	BM 1/UNSCOM 3
18 July - 20 July 1991	BM 2/UNSCOM 10
8 August - 15 August 1991	BM 3/UNSCOM 8
6 September - 13 September 1991	BM 4/UNSCOM 13
1 October - 9 October 1991	BM 5/UNSCOM 18
1 December - 9 December 1991	BM 6/UNSCOM 23
9 December - 17 December 1991	BM 7/UNSCOM 24
21 February - 29 February 1992	BM 8/UNSCOM 28
21 March - 29 March 1992	BM 9/UNSCOM 31
13 April - 21 April 1992	BM 10/UNSCOM 34
14 May - 22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM 36
11 July - 29 July 1992	BM 12/UNSCOM 40A+B
7 August - 18 August 1992	BM 13/UNSCOM 42
16 October - 30 October 1992	BM 14/UNSCOM 45
25 January - 22 March 1993	IMT 1a/UNSCOM 48
12 February - 23 February 1993	BM 15/UNSCOM 50
22 February - 23 February 1993	BM 16/UNSCOM 51
27 March 1993 - ongoing	IMT 1b/UNSCOM 54

CHEMICAL

9 June - 15 June 1991	CW 1/UNSCOM 2
15 August - 22 August 1991	CW 2/UNSCOM 9
31 August - 8 September 1991	CW 3/UNSCOM 11
31 August - 5 September 1991	CW 4/UNSCOM 12
6 October - 9 November 1991	CW 5/UNSCOM 17
22 October - 2 November 1991	CW 6/UNSCOM 20
18 November - 1 December 1991	CBW 1/UNSCOM 21
27 January - 5 February 1992	CW 7/UNSCOM 26
21 February - 24 March 1992	CD 1/UNSCOM 29
5 April - 13 April 1992	CD 2/UNSCOM 32
15 April - 29 April 1992	CW 8/UNSCOM 35
18 June 1992 ongoing	CDG/UNSCOM 38
26 June - 10 July 1992	CBW 2/UNSCOM 39
21 September - 29 September 1992	CW 9/UNSCOM 44
6 December - 14 December 1992	CBW 3/UNSCOM 47
9 April - 15 April 1993	CW 10/UNSCOM 55

BIOLOGICAL

2 August - 8 August 1991	BW 1/UNSCOM 7
20 September - 3 October 1991	BW 2/UNSCOM 15
11 March - 18 March 1993	BW 3/UNSCOM 53

SPECIAL MISSIONS

30 June - 3 July 1991
11 August - 14 August 1991
4 October - 6 October 1991
11 November - 15 November 1991
27 January - 30 January 1992
21 February - 24 February 1992
17 July - 19 July 1992
28 July - 29 July 1992
6 September - 12 September 1992
4 November - 9 November 1992
13 March - 22 March 1993
17 April - 25 April 1993

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